- 21 - reflect the realities of petitioner's underlying claims. As discussed above, neither party had any interest in ensuring that the allocation language accurately represented the risks of the various claims. The attorneys for both sides felt that petitioner's contract and fraud claims were the strongest, and his tort claim of outrageous conduct among the weakest. Blount especially feared a runaway jury on punitive damages in the event that the case were remanded to State court, since Alabama juries were "known" for their large punitive damages awards. Despite the foregoing, the settlement agreement allocated 80 percent of the lump-sum proceeds to personal injury claims, only 20 percent to the contract claim arising out of the April 27 letter, and nothing whatsoever to the fraud claims and punitive damages claims. Thus, in contrast to McKay v. Commissioner, supra, the settlement agreement was not based on counsels' estimates of the probability of success on the merits had the case gone to trial. See McShane v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-151. Moreover, we note that, unlike McShane v. Commissioner, supra, the tax effects of the allocation were considered by petitioner during the negotiations on December 2, 1991. Contrary to petitioners' request, we shall not blindly accept the parties' allocation of settlement proceeds where, as here, the allocation is patently inconsistent with the realities of the underlying claims as determined by the attorneys for bothPage: Previous 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Next
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