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impact in determining the requisite intent of the payment.
Brennan v. Commissioner, supra; Sodoma v. Commissioner, supra;
see also Keel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-278; Foster v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-26. Respondent further argues
that IBM did not make the payment on account of a personal
injury. The release form appears to be a standard document used
by IBM for all of its employees who participate in the ITO II
Program. Moreover, the amount of the $74,985 lump-sum payment
was calculated on the number of years of service and petitioner's
salary. Finally, the release states that if petitioner were
rehired by IBM, he could be required to repay some portion of the
lump-sum payment based on the number of weeks off the IBM payroll
compared with the number of weeks' salary used to calculate the
lump-sum payment. As in Brennan v. Commissioner, supra, Sodoma
v. Commissioner, supra, and Webb v. Commissioner, supra, the
lump-sum payment herein appears to have been severance pay rather
than a payment for personal injury. Severance pay, just like the
pay it replaces, is taxable income.
Finally, we note that petitioner has not alleged or come
forward with any evidence of the specific amounts of the payments
allocable to claims of tort or tort-type damages for personal
injuries. The release makes no allocation, and petitioner has
not set forth any facts upon which he would rely to prove an
allocation. Indeed, the fact that the $74,985 was based on years
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