-5-
$25,1123 ($82,072 - $45,332 - $11,628) of unidentified deposits.
The use of bank deposits to reconstruct income is well
established. DiLeo v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 867 (1991), affd.
959 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1992); Parks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 654, 658
(1990); Nicholas v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1057, 1064 (1978); Estate
of Mason v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 651, 656 (1975), affd. 566 F.2d
2 (6th Cir. 1977). "The bank deposits method assumes that all
money deposited in a taxpayer's bank account during a given period
constitutes taxable income." DiLeo v. Commissioner, supra at 868.
But the making of a bank deposit per se does not mean that the
amount so deposited is income. Goe v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 851,
852 (3d Cir. 1952); Vuitch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-95.
However, where the Commissioner has determined that the deposits
constitute income, the taxpayer has the burden of showing the
Commissioner's determination was incorrect. See United States v.
Massei, 355 U.S. 595 (1958); Parks v. Commissioner, supra at 661.
In explaining the source of the unidentified deposits,
petitioner testified that he borrowed moneys in 1992 from various
finance companies--Chrysler First Co., Commercial Credit Corp., and
Rose Shanis Co. Petitioner also testified that in 1992 he
periodically received money from his father-in-law (Roman
Shumatsky) totaling approximately $10,000 as well as from Roland
3 The differing amounts exist due to the inconsistency
between the amount of total bank deposits stated in the notice of
deficiency ($80,096 or $81,029) and respondent's brief ($82,072).
See supra note 1.
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