- 8 -
on the determination of the present controversy." We disagree
with petitioner's assertion.
If petitioner received his disability benefits under the
agreement rather than under the City ordinance, it is clear that
the payments were not received under a statute in the nature of a
worker's compensation act. Rutter v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 466,
468 (2d Cir. 1985) (labor contract does not qualify as a
"statute" within the meaning of sec. 1.104-1(b), Income Tax
Regs.), affg. T.C. Memo. 1984-525; Covert v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1990-598.
Whether petitioner received his payments under the City
ordinance or under the Union agreement is a question that also
renders more doubtful the meaning of the parties' stipulation
that the ordinance has been "applied in practice" to grant
benefits only for work-related injuries or sickness. We cannot
be sure by whom the ordinance has been so applied, Union
officials or City officials (and if so which ones), or in what
manner such officials may have carried out the referred to
"practice".
Assuming, arguendo, that the "consistent" application of the
City ordinance was by an administrative body of the City, the
record is insufficient for us to determine whether such an
"application" had the force and effect of law. See Dyer v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 560, 562 (1979); Beisler v Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1985-25, affd. 787 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1986), affd. en
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011