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all matters * * * as freely, fully, and effectively as I could or
might do personally if present”. This language evidences an
intent to permit the attorneys in fact to make gifts of
decedent's property. See Taylor v. Vernon, 652 A.2d 912 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (finding similar language evidenced an intent to
allow the attorney in fact to make gifts of the principal's
property); cf. Whitford v. Gaskill, 480 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. 1997)
(finding that the power to “transfer” real estate authorized the
attorney in fact to make gifts of the property in dispute).
Respondent argues that this Court should not allow
decedent's intent to make a gift or decedent's ratification of a
gift to be proved by the oral testimony of interested parties;
namely Mr. Hunt. Respondent points to various factors which she
contends show that decedent did not intend to make present inter
vivos gifts at the time of the transfers. We disagree. As we
have already found, petitioner's witnesses were credible, and
their testimony was supported by the record. See Diaz v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 560 (1972) (basing analysis upon evaluation
of the entire record and the credibility of witnesses); cf.
Estate of Goldman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-29. In
determining the intent of decedent, we have looked at “The facts
and circumstances surrounding the parties, their relationship,
and the direct expressions of the decedent”. Foster v. Rose, 238
P.2d 332 (Okla. 1951). Based on the record as a whole, we
conclude that decedent, acting through her attorneys in fact,
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