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67 T.C. 181, 199 (1976), affd. without published opinion 578 F.2d
1383 (8th Cir. 1978). Direct proof of intent is rarely
available, so courts may look to circumstantial evidence and draw
reasonable inferences from the facts. Spies v. United States,
317 U.S. 492 (1943); Bradford v. Commissioner, 796 F.2d 303, 307
(9th Cir. 1986), affg. T.C. Memo. 1984-601. Fraud must be
affirmatively established and is never imputed or presumed.
Beaver v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 85, 92 (1970).
For the Commissioner to carry her burden of proving that the
underpayment of tax is attributable to fraud, she must show that
a taxpayer intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent the
collection of taxes. Powell v. Granquist, 252 F.2d 56, 60-61
(9th Cir. 1958); Rowlee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 1111, 1123
(1983). A taxpayer's entire course of conduct can be indicative
of fraud. Stone v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 213, 224 (1971); Otsuki
v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 96, 105-106 (1969).
Over the years, courts have developed a nonexclusive list of
factors that demonstrate fraudulent intent. These badges of
fraud include: (1) Understating income, (2) keeping inadequate
records, (3) offering implausible or inconsistent explanations of
behavior, (4) concealing assets, and (5) failing to cooperate
with the Commissioner's agent. See Bradford v. Commissioner,
supra at 303, and cases cited therein; Recklitis v. Commissioner,
91 T.C. 874, 910 (1988). Although no single factor necessarily
suffices to establish fraud, a confluence of factors constitutes
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