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is a hybrid--part separate entity, part aggregate." Schneer v.
Commissioner, 97 T.C. 643, 660 (1991). For purposes of
interpreting Code provisions outside of subchapter K, a
partnership may be treated as either an entity, separate from its
partners, or an aggregate of its partners depending on which
characterization is more appropriate to carry out the intent
and/or purpose of the particular Internal Revenue Code section
under consideration. Brown Group, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner,
104 T.C. 105, 116 (1995), vacated and remanded on other grounds
77 F.3d 217 (8th Cir. 1996); Casel v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 424,
432-433 (1982).
Respondent argues that Congress intended section 1056 to
apply broadly, to include the sale of an interest in a
partnership that operates a sports franchise. Respondent
contends that the section 1056 legislative history contains
indications that Congress sought to prevent inconsistent player
contract valuations by sellers and buyers of sports teams.
Finally, respondent contends that if section 1056 is not applied
to the sale of a partnership interest, inconsistent valuations of
player contracts could occur, contrary to congressional intent.
Relying on those points, respondent maintains that it is
appropriate to apply the aggregate theory of partnerships for
purposes of section 1056's application to partnership
transactions to prevent this perceived abuse.
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