Benjamin H. and Diane E. Robson - Page 9

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          analysis has a correlation to fair market value in this case.2              
          See Epping v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-279.                            
               We conclude that an active market exists throughout the                
          United States for substantially comparable items.  Petitioners              
          have not presented any evidence of comparable sales, relying                
          solely on Mr. Perry's valuations.  Consequently, petitioners have           
          failed to carry their burden of proving that the donated game               
          mounts are worth more than the amount established by respondent             
          at trial.  Thus, we conclude that, based on respondent's                    
          appraisal, the animal specimens donated by petitioner Robson have           
          a fair market value of $29,100, and the specimens donated by                
          petitioner Trnavsky have a fair market value of $16,600.3                   
          Deductibility of Appraisal Fees                                             
               Respondent does not dispute that appraisal fees are deduct-            
          ible under section 212(3) but contends that the amount of fees              
          paid for Mr. Duncan's services is unreasonable, and, therefore,             

               2Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-515,                
          affd. without published opinion 983 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1993), is            
          distinguishable.  In Estate of Miller, the taxpayer donated                 
          numerous animal mounts to the State of Louisiana and claimed                
          charitable contribution deductions.  Replacement cost was                   
          probative in the Estate of Miller case because the Court found              
          that no comparable items could be obtained in the market.  Here,            
          respondent has successfully demonstrated that items comparable to           
          petitioners' did exist in the market.                                       
               3The fair market value of petitioner Robson's charitable               
          contributions is $7,550, $12,125, and $9,425 for 1990, 1991, and            
          1992, respectively.  The fair market value of petitioner                    
          Trnavsky's charitable contributions is $5,750, $4,000, and $6,850           
          for 1990, 1991, and 1992, respectively.  For a more detailed                
          listing of each donation, see appendix, infra.                              




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