- 9 -
analysis has a correlation to fair market value in this case.2
See Epping v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-279.
We conclude that an active market exists throughout the
United States for substantially comparable items. Petitioners
have not presented any evidence of comparable sales, relying
solely on Mr. Perry's valuations. Consequently, petitioners have
failed to carry their burden of proving that the donated game
mounts are worth more than the amount established by respondent
at trial. Thus, we conclude that, based on respondent's
appraisal, the animal specimens donated by petitioner Robson have
a fair market value of $29,100, and the specimens donated by
petitioner Trnavsky have a fair market value of $16,600.3
Deductibility of Appraisal Fees
Respondent does not dispute that appraisal fees are deduct-
ible under section 212(3) but contends that the amount of fees
paid for Mr. Duncan's services is unreasonable, and, therefore,
2Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-515,
affd. without published opinion 983 F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1993), is
distinguishable. In Estate of Miller, the taxpayer donated
numerous animal mounts to the State of Louisiana and claimed
charitable contribution deductions. Replacement cost was
probative in the Estate of Miller case because the Court found
that no comparable items could be obtained in the market. Here,
respondent has successfully demonstrated that items comparable to
petitioners' did exist in the market.
3The fair market value of petitioner Robson's charitable
contributions is $7,550, $12,125, and $9,425 for 1990, 1991, and
1992, respectively. The fair market value of petitioner
Trnavsky's charitable contributions is $5,750, $4,000, and $6,850
for 1990, 1991, and 1992, respectively. For a more detailed
listing of each donation, see appendix, infra.
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011