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‘the intent of the payor’ as to the purpose in making the
payment") (citing Knuckles v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 610, 612
(10th Cir. 1965), affg. T.C. Memo. 1964-33); Metzger v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834, 847-848 (1987), affd. without
published opinion 845 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1988). Nor do we infer
from the general release included in the settlement agreement
that any portion of the settlement proceeds constitutes payment
for personal injury claims not specified in that agreement. See
Galligan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-605.
C. Bargained For Consideration
Petitioner argues alternatively that, even if the settlement
proceeds per se do not constitute damages on account of personal
injuries, he received a share of those proceeds by way of the
option agreement, the Weisel resignation agreement, and the
Weisel-petitioner sharing agreement (collectively, the pertinent
agreements) in consideration for his “willingly let[ting] the
claims for damages to reputation and good will be eliminated in
the third amended complaint so the settlement could be directed
toward receipt of insurance proceeds.”
Petitioner has failed to convince us, however, that he
received the Weisel payment in consideration for giving up
(settling) any claims for damages on account of personal
injuries. None of the pertinent agreements mentions the
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