- 22 -                                         
          memorandum or in any manner attempt to research the business                
          aspects of the Plymouth transaction.  In view of petitioners'               
          failure seriously to investigate or learn about the Plymouth                
          transaction, we are not convinced that they invested in Plymouth            
          with an honest objective of making an economic profit, regardless           
          of the so-called oil crisis.                                                
               Moreover, petitioners did not adequately explain how the so-           
          called oil crisis provided a reasonable basis for them to invest            
          in Plymouth and claim the associated operating loss and credits.            
          The offering memorandum warned that there could be no assurances            
          that prices for new resin pellets would remain at their then                
          current level.  One of respondent's experts, Steven Grossman,               
          explained that the price of plastics materials is not directly              
          proportional to the price of oil.  In his report, he stated that            
          less than 10 percent of crude oil is utilized for making plastics           
          materials and that studies have shown that "a 300% increase in              
          crude oil prices results in only a 30 to 40% increase in the cost           
          of plastics products."  Furthermore, during 1980 and 1981, in               
          addition to the media coverage of the so-called oil crisis, there           
          was "extensive continuing press coverage of questionable tax                
          shelter plans."  Zmuda v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 1417, 1422 (9th            
          Cir. 1984), affg. 79 T.C. 714 (1982).                                       
               Petitioners' reliance on Krause v. Commissioner, 99 T.C. 132           
          (1992), affd. sub nom. Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 28 F.3d 1024             
          (10th Cir. 1994), is misplaced.  The facts in the Krause case are           
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