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time. Respondent did not notify petitioners or any other
taxpayers of the disposition of the Miller cases. Estate of
Satin v. Commissioner, supra; Fisher v. Commissioner, supra.
Petitioners argue that they are similarly situated to
Miller, the taxpayer in the Miller cases, and that pursuant to
the principle of "equality" they are therefore entitled to the
same settlement agreement executed by respondent and Miller in
those cases. In effect, petitioners seek to resurrect the
piggyback agreement offer and/or the settlement offer they
previously failed to accept.
Petitioners contend that under the principle of "equality,"
the Commissioner has a duty of consistency toward similarly
situated taxpayers and cannot tax one and not tax another without
some rational basis for the difference. United States v. Kaiser,
363 U.S. 299, 308 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Baker
v. United States, 748 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984); Farmers' &
Merchants' Bank v. United States, 476 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973).
According to petitioners, the principle of equality precludes the
Commissioner from making arbitrary distinctions between like
cases. See Baker v. Commissioner, 787 F.2d 637, 643 (D.C. Cir.
1986), vacating 83 T.C. 822 (1984).
The different tax treatment accorded petitioners and Miller
was not arbitrary or irrational. While petitioners and Miller
both invested in the Plastics Recycling transactions, their
actions with respect to such investments provide a rational basis
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