- 19 -
that it owed Exxon nothing.12 Petitioner cannot now switch hats
and attempt to show how meritorious Exxon's claims actually were.
Instead, the settlement agreement of February 10, 1992, serves as
both Exxon's and petitioner's assessment of the value of the now
compromised claims.
Petitioner further alleges that certain provisions of the
unit and unit operating agreements provided Exxon with an
enforceable lien against the Allen parties' interests in the HFU
and entitled Exxon to restitution of the overcharges. Cf.
Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d at 1253-1254. We disagree.
The relevant provisions petitioner refers to address the
relationship between Exxon, as operator of the HFU, and the other
working interest owners in the HFU. Thus, neither provision is
applicable to the Allen parties who, in contrast, were royalty
interest owners in the HFU. In addition, we note that no
provision of the unit operating agreement is applicable to
royalty interest owners, as the agreement only addresses the
relationship between Exxon and the other working interest owners
in the HFU.
We also reject petitioner's attempt to find a lien within
the Allen parties' oil and gas leases. The relevant provision in
the leases stated, in pertinent part:
12For instance, shortly after filing its Federal estate tax
return in July 1991, petitioner filed a document with the special
master in the Jarvis Christian litigation objecting to Exxon's
damage calculations.
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