Jeff R. Taylor - Page 5

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          depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,                
          together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no                 
          genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be            
          rendered as a matter of law."  Id.; Sundstrand Corp. v.                     
          Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th               
          Cir. 1994).  The moving party bears the burden of proving that              
          there is no genuine issue of material fact, and factual                     
          inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the                    
          nonmoving party.  United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,             
          655 (1962); Preece v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 594, 597 (1990).  The           
          existence of any reasonable doubt as to the facts will result in            
          denial of the motion for summary judgment.  Hoeme v.                        
          Commissioner, 63 T.C. 18, 20 (1974).                                        
               The instant case is ripe for partial summary judgment.  It             
          is well established that petitioner's conviction of criminal tax            
          evasion, under section 7201, collaterally estops him from denying           
          that the deficiency in his income tax for the year in issue was             
          due to fraud for purposes of section 6653(b).  DiLeo v.                     
          Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 885-886 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d            
          Cir. 1992).  The elements of criminal tax evasion under section             
          7201 are not dissimilar to the elements of civil tax fraud under            
          section 6653(b), and a guilty plea is equivalent to a conviction            
          after trial for the purpose of collateral estoppel.  See, e.g.,             
          Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 722 (5th Cir. 1995); Gray v.                
          Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1983), affg. T.C. Memo.                




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