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the Congress intended that the term mean, or what the Congress
intended that the term not mean. The boundaries of the term
“inures” have thus far defied precise definition. As respondent
points out, petitioner’s suggestion that inurement means the
intentional conferring of a benefit cannot be allowed to mean
that there is no inurement unless “all the organizations’
officers and board members have actual knowledge of, and
affirmatively act to cause, the prohibited benefit.” By the same
token, we do not believe that the Congress intended that a
charity must lose its exempt status merely because a president or
a treasurer or an executive director of a charity has skimmed or
embezzled or otherwise stolen from the charity, at least where
the charity has a real-world existence apart from the thieving
official.
We conclude that petitioner had such a real-world existence,
see supra tables 1 and 2, and that Zeve’s and Popovic’s thefts
from petitioner were not inurements of petitioner’s net earnings.
We hold for petitioner on this issue.
(2A) Attorney’s Fees--Climaco
Respondent notes that petitioner paid $10,000 to Climaco on
November 28, 1986, that a complaint was filed against petitioner,
Zeve, Popovic, and Wilkens on May 11, 1987, and that Climaco
10(...continued)
12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899). (“We do not inquire what the
legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”)
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