Glen L. Wittstadt, Jr. and Lynne M. Wittstadt - Page 10

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          taxpayer, a Maryland public school teacher, elected to transfer              
          from the Retirement System to the Pension System, effective                  
          January 1, 1990, and received thereafter a Transfer Refund.  In              
          May 1990, the taxpayer applied for retirement and retired in                 
          fact, effective July 1, 1990.  Hylton concluded as follows:                  
                    Petitioners have shown that petitioner's election                  
               to transfer to the Pension System, due to which                         
               election he received the Transfer Refund, was related                   
               to his retirement planning.  In other words, they have                  
               demonstrated that the decision to retire was a "link in                 
               the chain of causalities" leading to the receipt of the                 
               Transfer Refund. [Citation omitted.] However, we view                   
               petitioner's separation from service as no more than a                  
               "mere link in the chain of causalities" leading to the                  
               receipt of the Transfer Refund. [Citation omitted.]                     
                    Accordingly, we hold that petitioner did not                       
               receive the Transfer Refund on account of his                           
               retirement.  Rather, he received the Transfer Refund                    
               because of his election to transfer from the Retirement                 
               System to the Pension System, an election that, under                   
               Maryland law, lacked the requisite connection to                        
               petitioner's separation from service.                                   
               In reaching the foregoing conclusion, we relied heavily on              
          Gunnison v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1766 (1970), affd. 461 F.2d 496            
          (7th Cir. 1972), where we considered the meaning of the phrase               
          "on account of" in an earlier version of the operative statute               
          and construed it narrowly.  Id. at 1773.                                     
               Hylton was never appealed, and the decision in that case                
          became final on April 25, 1995.  See sec. 7481(a)(1), 7483; cf.              
          Fed. R. App. P. 13(a).                                                       








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