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Petitioner kept all of his possessions in the condominium
and spent most weekends and holidays at the condominium. Unlike
the taxpayers in Friedman v. Commissioner, supra, and Stolk v.
Commissioner, supra, petitioner did not own or occupy any other
dwelling in the San Francisco Bay Area on a regular basis or for
periods greater than the time he spent at the condominium. The
phrase "used by the taxpayer as his principal residence" means
habitual use of the residence. In Perry v. Commissioner, supra
at 85, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated:
While literal definitions of "home" are elusive, here
it is enough * * * that a residence is "one's actual
home, in the sense of having no other home, whether
[one] intends to reside there permanently or for a
definite or indefinite length of time." Dwyer v.
Matson, 163 F.2d 299, 302 (10th Cir. 1947).[Alteration
made by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.]
The condominium was petitioner's actual home; he had no
other home. We find that for purposes of section 1034(a) the
condominium was petitioner's primary residence as of August 27,
1988.
Since the condominium is the last residence used by
petitioner during the 2-year period after the date of the sale of
the former residence, the condominium constitutes the new
residence with respect to the sale of the former residence. Sec.
1034(c)(4). Since the Castro Valley house was not petitioner's
new principal residence for purposes of the deferral of gain on
the sale of petitioner's former residence, petitioner's adjusted
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