- 24 -
VI. Holdings
For all the reasons set forth above, we reject respondent's
arguments, apply stare decisis, follow Security Bank Minn. v.
Commissioner, supra, and Security State Bank v. Commissioner,
supra, and hold that section 1281(a) does not apply to IFNB's
short-term consumer, commercial, and agricultural loans made to
its customers. However, we hold that genuine issues of material
fact exist--which issues must be resolved by a trial or obviated
by agreement of the parties--before the proper tax treatment of
20(...continued)
exist--and has declined to grant summary judgment for either
party--where cross-motions have been made. See Estate of
Wilbanks v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 306, 315-316 (1990); Krause v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1003, 1026-27 (1989); Take v. Commissioner,
supra; Burford v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-466.
The same approach has been used by courts deciding cross-
motions for summary judgment under the analogous Federal rule,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. As has been stated by one of the leading
treatises on Federal civil procedure:
When litigants concurrently pursue
summary judgment, the first impression of the
uninitiated is often that at least one party
inevitably will be victorious and obtain
summary judgment. However, this seemingly
intuitive impression is incorrect. * * *
Each individual summary judgment motion must
be evaluated independently to determine
whether there exists a genuine dispute of
material fact and whether movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. [11 Moore's
Federal Practice sec. 56.10[6] (3d ed. 1998)
at 56-57; fn. ref. omitted.]
See also 10A Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil
sec. 2720 (3d ed. 1998), and the cases cited therein.
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