Lawrence W. Bartlett - Page 4

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          a statute in the nature of a workmen's compensation act--the                
          Warwick Code.  Prior to trial respondent conceded that the                  
          Warwick Code meets the requirements of section 104 and contended            
          that petitioner's pension payments were made pursuant to the                
          collective bargaining agreement.  Respondent maintained this                
          position in his pretrial memorandum and during a pretrial                   
          conference call with petitioner and the Court.  When questioned             
          by the Court at trial, however, respondent's counsel was unable             
          to support his contention.  On brief respondent's attempt to                
          support this contention was equally unconvincing.                           
               The Warwick Code, not the collective bargaining agreement,             
          authorized petitioner's pension.  Cf. Fotis v. Commissioner, T.C.           
          Memo. 1989-287 (finding that payments to a disabled police                  
          officer were made pursuant to municipal law, not a collective               
          bargaining agreement).  Contrary to respondent's contention, the            
          portion of the collective bargaining agreement that states                  
          "[firefighters] shall be entitled to all of the benefits of the             
          ordinances of the City of Warwick," merely preserves                        
          firefighters' rights under all the city's ordinances.  It does              
          not authorize a service-connected disability pension.  Thus, we             
          conclude that petitioner's pension payments were made pursuant to           
          the Warwick Code, not the collective bargaining agreement.                  
               On brief respondent, for the first time, attempts to narrow            
          the concession by asserting that the statute, standing alone,               
          meets the requirements of section 104 but that the Court should             




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