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January 1, 1985,2 and the divorce decree provides that Gary
"shall be allowed the exemption[s] * * * for the minor children".
Petitioner argues that it is inequitable to deny her the
exemptions because, when the medical expenses that Gary has not
paid are considered, she paid more than half of the support of
the children. We answered the same question in McClendon v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1, 3-4 (1980):
However sympathetic we may be towards petitioner, the
statute is clear on its face and leaves no room for implied
exceptions. * * * [Section 152(e)(4)] was intended to
provide a means whereby the parties to a divorce could take
dependency exemptions directly into consideration when
planning financial arrangements attendant to the divorce.
The overriding purpose of the section is to provide
certainty to the parties. We would subvert the intent and
the spirit of the statute if we held that there was an
implied exception when the party entitled to the exemption
is not in compliance with the divorce decree. The statute
is absolute, and its plain language must control. [Emphasis
in original; citations and fn. ref. omitted.]
The divorce decree is a matter of State law, and, if it is to be
further amended, it is a matter for the State court and not this
Court.
Decision will be entered
for respondent.
2 While the divorce decree was amended or modified after
that date, the pre-1985 provision in paragraph 18, relating to
the exemptions, was not modified and remains fully in effect.
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