- 7 -
Petitioners’ overriding argument based on the TEFRA
statutory provisions is that this Court's jurisdiction over TEFRA
settlement procedures is broader than this Court's jurisdiction
over cases in general. Petitioners point to the "Except as
otherwise provided" language of section 6221 and to the language
of section 6224(c)(2). Petitioners interpret the language of the
latter section as providing that once a partnership becomes
subject to the TEFRA provisions for any year and for any purpose,
the partnership and each of its partners should be treated, for
settlement purposes, as becoming subject to the TEFRA partnership
provisions for all years. Petitioners then argue that under such
TEFRA settlement provisions they were entitled in 1994 and later
years, when they settled with respondent their particular Elektra
Hemisphere tax shelter cases, to be specifically informed of and
to take advantage of the most favorable settlement terms that
respondent ever offered any of the partners in the Elektra
Hemisphere tax shelters (namely, the cash settlements available
during 1986, 1987, and 1989).
Respondent emphasizes that the no-cash settlements that
petitioners now seek to disavow are based on and are consistent
with the results of the test cases that were decided with respect
to the Elektra Hemisphere tax shelters. Krause v. Commissioner,
99 T.C. 132 (1992); see also Acierno v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1997-441. Respondent argues that petitioners (having refused to
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011