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Without the requirement of a formal written agreement, respondent
anticipates confusion and judicial inefficiency: disputes will
arise over whether there was a settlement and will necessitate
judicial review as to whether there was a settlement and the
terms thereof. Since respondent and Mr. Newman have not executed
either form, respondent contends that they have not entered into
a settlement agreement.
While respondent's position may have the advantages that
respondent attributes to it, we believe that it is unnecessary to
decide that issue in the circumstances presented here. Where
settlement is conditioned upon the execution of respondent's
forms, the execution of such forms controls resolution of whether
a settlement agreement was in fact made. See, e.g., Estate of
Ray v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-561, affd. 112 F.3d 194 (5th
Cir. 1997); see also Brookstone Corp. v. United States, 74 AFTR
2d 94-6025, 94-2 USTC par. 50,474 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd. per
curiam without published opinion 58 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 1995). We
turn to the question whether the settlement here was so
conditioned.
7(...continued)
what constitutes a "settlement agreement" for purposes of secs.
6224(c) and 6231(b)(1)(C). A closing agreement (Form 906),
statutorily authorized by secs. 7121 and 7122 has been used to
settle TEFRA cases. See, e.g., Pack v. United States, 992 F.2d
955, 956 (9th Cir. 1993); Monge v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl.
720, 722 n.3 (1993). In addition, we have held that a Form 870-P
qualifies as a settlement agreement under sec. 6224(c). Korff v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-33.
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