City of Columbus, Ohio - Page 4

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               It is clear that the threshold question is a narrow one:               
          Does the acquisition of one's indebtedness constitute an                    
          acquisition of property so as to bring section 148 into play?2              
               It is petitioner's position that the prepayment extinguished           
          its indebtedness to the State fund and that it acquired no                  
          property in that transaction.  It is respondent's position that             
          petitioner's prepayment was investment-type property.  Respondent           
          describes the result of petitioner's prepayment as "the city                
          received economic property through this investment use."                    
          Respondent argues that to allow petitioner to issue tax-exempt              
          bonds contravenes the intent of section 148 through the use of a            
          vehicle similar to that of the prepayment for property or                   
          services described in section 1.148-1(b), Income Tax Regs.                  
               The purpose of section 148 is to prevent the use of tax-               
          exempt bonds to acquire higher-yielding investment property.                
          City of Columbus v. Commissioner, 112 F.3d at 1207; Conf. Rept.             
          99-841 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) 1, 747 ("the arbitrage                  
          restrictions are expanded to apply to the acquisition of any                
          property held for investment other than another bond exempt from            
          tax under Code section 103."); sec. 1.148-10(a), Income Tax Regs.           
          Section 148(b)(2) defines investment property to include any                
          security, any obligation, any annuity contract, and any                     

               2  We left this question aside in our original opinion, and            
          the Court of Appeals did likewise.  City of Columbus v.                     
          Commissioner, 106 T.C. 325, 334 (1996), revd. and remanded 112              
          F.3d 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1997).                                           




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