- 4 - It is clear that the threshold question is a narrow one: Does the acquisition of one's indebtedness constitute an acquisition of property so as to bring section 148 into play?2 It is petitioner's position that the prepayment extinguished its indebtedness to the State fund and that it acquired no property in that transaction. It is respondent's position that petitioner's prepayment was investment-type property. Respondent describes the result of petitioner's prepayment as "the city received economic property through this investment use." Respondent argues that to allow petitioner to issue tax-exempt bonds contravenes the intent of section 148 through the use of a vehicle similar to that of the prepayment for property or services described in section 1.148-1(b), Income Tax Regs. The purpose of section 148 is to prevent the use of tax- exempt bonds to acquire higher-yielding investment property. City of Columbus v. Commissioner, 112 F.3d at 1207; Conf. Rept. 99-841 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) 1, 747 ("the arbitrage restrictions are expanded to apply to the acquisition of any property held for investment other than another bond exempt from tax under Code section 103."); sec. 1.148-10(a), Income Tax Regs. Section 148(b)(2) defines investment property to include any security, any obligation, any annuity contract, and any 2 We left this question aside in our original opinion, and the Court of Appeals did likewise. City of Columbus v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 325, 334 (1996), revd. and remanded 112 F.3d 1201, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1997).Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Next
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