Walter C Demattia and Elizabeth J. Crouse - Page 9

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          of whether the requisite profit objective exists is to be                   
          resolved on the basis of all the surrounding facts and                      
          circumstances.  Finoli v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 697, 722 (1986);            
          Allen v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 28, 34 (1979).  Petitioners bear             
          the burden of proving that Dr. DeMattia entered into and remained           
          in the golf sponsorship activity with the requisite profit                  
          objective.  Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933);           
          Beck v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 557, 570 (1985); Flowers v.                   
          Commissioner, 80 T.C. 914, 931 (1983).8                                     
               Section 1.183-2(b), Income Tax Regs., sets forth a                     
          nonexclusive list of nine factors to be considered when                     
          ascertaining a taxpayer's intent.  These factors are:  (1) The              
          manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the               
          expertise of the taxpayer or his advisers; (3) the time and                 
          effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity;                
          (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may                    
          appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying            
          on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's               
          history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the           
          amount of occasional profits, if any; (8) the financial status of           
          the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal pleasure or                      
          recreation.  All facts and circumstances must be taken into                 

               8  Sec. 183(d) provides a statutory reversal of the burden             
          of proof if petitioners meet specified criteria.  Petitioners do            
          not meet such criteria.                                                     




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