- 10 - Poplar v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-337; Schillinger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-640, affd. without published opinion 1 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1993). In all these cases we required a showing of reasonable effort by the taxpayer to ensure that the investment was a viable, profit-motivated transaction in order for the taxpayer to avoid imposition of the negligence additions. In an attempt to distinguish himself from the taxpayers in Buck, and other cases where negligence additions have been sustained, petitioner cites Heasley v. Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990), revg. T.C. Memo. 1988-408; Durrett v. Commissioner, 71 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1994-179; Chamberlain v. Commissioner, 66 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 1995), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1994-228; Mauerman v. Commissioner, 22 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 1994), revg. T.C. Memo. 1993-23. Petitioner cites these cases as support for his contention that it was reasonable and not negligent for him to rely on the advice of a professional adviser without second-guessing or independently verifying the adviser. To require otherwise, petitioner argues, would nullify the purpose for seeking advice in the first place. See Heasley v. Commissioner, supra. However, these cases are distinguishable because they involve taxpayers who performed significantly more investigation into the merits of the investment and/or sought outPage: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Next
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