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Without the requirement of a formal written agreement, respondent
anticipates confusion and judicial inefficiency: disputes will
arise over whether there was a settlement and will necessitate
judicial review as to whether there was a settlement and the
terms thereof. Since respondent and the Goodwins have not
executed either form, respondent contends that they have not
entered into a settlement agreement.
While respondent's position may have the advantages
respondent attributes to it, we believe that it is unnecessary to
decide that issue in the circumstances presented here.11 Where
settlement is conditioned upon the execution of respondent's
forms, the execution of such forms controls resolution of whether
a settlement agreement was in fact made. See, e.g., Estate of
Ray v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-561, affd. 112 F.3d 194 (5th
Cir. 1997); see also Brookstone Corp. v. United States, 74 AFTR
2d 94-6025, 94-2 USTC par. 50,474 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affd. per
10(...continued)
settle TEFRA cases. See, e.g., Pack v. United States, 992 F.2d
955, 956 (9th Cir. 1993); Monge v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl.
720, 722 n.3 (1993). In addition, we have held that a Form 870-P
qualifies as a settlement agreement under sec. 6224(c). Korff v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-33.
11
Respondent also argues that even if there were a
binding settlement offer the Goodwins' acceptance was not timely.
Given our disposition of the issue, we see no reason to resolve
that question, and for our purposes here we assume that Mr.
Redding's letter was timely.
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