- 12 -
upon bankruptcy court's confirmation of a chapter 11 plan and
automatic stay was not reinstated despite the bankruptcy court's
decision to retain jurisdiction over the case).
Respondent argues that the above-referenced cases, and
particularly Kieu v. Commissioner, supra, can be factually
distinguished from the present case insofar as petitioner's
bankruptcy case was reinstated before petitioner filed her
petition for redetermination with the Court. Respondent relies
on In re Diviney, 211 Bankr. 951 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1997), for
the proposition that the bankruptcy court's reinstatement of
petitioners' bankruptcy case caused the automatic stay to be
reinstated.
Although we agree that In re Diviney, supra, stands for the
proposition cited by respondent, we are not persuaded that we are
obliged to find that the automatic stay was reinstated in this
case. To the contrary, we adhere to Allison v. Commissioner,
supra at 546-547, and specifically Kieu v. Commissioner, supra at
395, in which we held:
While an argument might be made that the
bankruptcy court's intent to reinstate the automatic
stay in the present case may be inferred from the fact
that the bankruptcy court vacated its order [granting
the creditors' motion for summary judgment], we decline
to decide the issue presented in this case on such an
assumption. We are mindful that the automatic stay
respecting the commencement or continuation of
proceedings in this Court was adopted in part to avert
duplicative and inconsistent litigation over tax
issues. Halpern v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 895, 902
(1991). Given the consequences, however, that follow
from a determination respecting the status of the
automatic stay, the soundest approach is to adhere to
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