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specifically are designated as payable for the support of a
child of the payor spouse.
In opposition to respondent's motion, and in support of
their cross-motion, petitioners argue that the contested payments
are alimony rather than child support inasmuch as petitioner was
also required to make separately allocated, fixed payments for
child support under the terms of paragraph 1 of the Judgment
during the years at issue. Petitioners maintain that section
71(c)(2) should not operate to "convert alimony payments to child
support when child support payments are already fixed in
accordance with section 71(c)(1)." Petitioners cite no authority
in support of this proposition, and we have found none.
We are satisfied that the contested payments in 1993, 1994,
and 1995 constitute nondeductible child support for Federal tax
purposes, notwithstanding the fact that the Judgment labeled such
payments "alimony" and the fact that the payments in question
appear to have met all of the definitional requirements of
section 71(b). See Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 340, 351-352
(1982); Heller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-423 ("As long as
the definitional requirements of section 71(b)(1) are met, the
parties' allocation of amounts are generally respected. Section
71(c)(2) represents one exception to this rule.") (fn. ref.
omitted; emphasis added).
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