- 9 -
is sufficiently qualified by the inclusion of the phrase "to the
extent necessary" that it is reasonable to view the order as
nothing more than the bankruptcy court's attempt to accommodate
petitioner. From either perspective, the bankruptcy court's
order does not affect our analysis.
Petitioner further contends that we should conclude that the
automatic stay was in effect in this case until the issuance of
the bankruptcy court's order on June 18, 1997, by virtue of an
argument raised by counsel for the Government during the
bankruptcy proceedings that the partnership should be treated as
petitioner's alter ego. We disagree. Notwithstanding that such
an argument was raised in the bankruptcy court, the record does
not indicate that petitioner ever filed a petition in bankruptcy,
nor was he ever named as a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Moreover, even if petitioner were named as debtor in a bankruptcy
proceeding, such event would require the partnership to appoint a
replacement TMP and would not serve to extend the period for
filing a timely petition for readjustment with the Court. See
Tempest Associates, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 794, 801-802
(1990).
Consistent with the foregoing, we shall grant respondent's
motion to dismiss insofar as the taxable year 1992 is concerned.
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