Lorvic Holdings, Inc. - Page 22

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            (1973).  The standard to be applied here is objective, utilizing                            
            a hypothetical willing buyer and seller.  The foregoing analysis                            
            is not, however, a specific standard that focuses on any                                    
            particular buyer or seller.  See Propstra v. United States, 680                             
            F.2d 1248, 1251-1252 (9th Cir. 1982).  In addition, the                                     
            determination of the fair market value of property is a matter of                           
            sound judgment, rather than of mathematics.  See In re Estate of                            
            Williams, 256 F.2d 217, 220 (9th Cir. 1958), affg. T.C. Memo.                               
            1956-239.  Moreover, since valuation is necessarily an                                      
            approximation, it is not required that the value we determine be                            
            one as to which there is specific evidence, provided it is within                           
            the range of figures that properly can be deduced from the                                  
            record.  Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir.                              
            1976), affg.  T.C. Memo. 1974-285; Hamm v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d                           
            934, 939-940 (8th Cir. 1963), affg. T.C. Memo. 1961-347.  Fair                              
            market value is determined on the applicable valuation date,                                
            which, in this case, is the date that Old Lorvic's assets were                              
            acquired by petitioner, and the agreements were implemented.                                
            Pabst Brewing Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-506.                                     
                  Respondent suggests petitioner possesses an incentive to                              
            allocate a large amount to the covenant not to compete because                              
            petitioner could amortize that amount over the life of the                                  
            covenant.  In that vein, respondent asserts that the payments                               







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