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limits the restricted consent to the failure to qualify for the
profit-split method election and that respondent's alternative
adjustment (seeking the recalculation of the combined taxable
income) presumes the allowance of the profit-split method in the
first place. We agree with petitioner.
The plain language of the restricted consent herein limits the
extension of the limitations period to the proposed disallowance of
the profit-split method election. See Ferguson v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 1992-451. Respondent seeks a different interpretation
because the restricted consent refers to the "use" of the profit-
split method rather than the "election" of the profit-split method.
While in some circumstances the word "use" might lead to the
meaning ascribed to it by respondent, we believe that in the
instant case the parties intended the word to mean "election". Our
reasons for this conclusion follow.
First, we consider the circumstances in which the restricted
consent was executed. Although respondent had issued six IDR's
seeking information on how petitioner and MS-Puerto Rico calculated
the combined taxable income, neither the NOPA (and the accompanying
McDonell report) nor the 30-day letter (and the accompanying RAR)
make any reference to the recalculation of the affiliated group's
5(...continued)
because we find other grounds for denying respondent's attempt to
recalculate the combined taxable income.
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