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will does not render the trust provisions superfluous or
meaningless--as petitioner contends. See Marlin v. Kelley, 678
S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex. App. 1984, writ granted 1985), affd. Kelley
v. Marlin, 714 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1986). The trust merely provides
an alternative plan of payment in case the primary direction of
decedent in article II fails for whatever reason. Wills commonly
contain such provisions to accommodate different scenarios upon
death.
Petitioner, citing no authority, also contends that various
portions of the Texas statute guarantee the marital deduction
regardless of decedent's intent regarding apportionment.
Petitioner claims that this construction of the statute is
supported by compelling public policy because the marital
deduction was designed to protect interests of surviving spouses
and should not be an unreasonable trap for the unwary.
These arguments are unsupported by the language or structure
of the statute, and no other apportionment statute has been
interpreted in this manner. Subsection (b)(1) of section 322A of
Texas Probate Code sets forth the general apportionment rule, and
subsections (c) through (y) are provisions setting forth how the
general rule is to be carried out. Subsections (c) through (y)
do not act independently of the general apportionment provision,
but rather supplement it. Thus, subsections (c) and (d) do not
guarantee that the marital deduction always inures to the benefit
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