Michael Morrissey - Page 16

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            while a transfer of property that is neither encumbered nor               
            satisfies a debt presents far less potential for causing loss             
            to the plan."  Id. at 162.                                                
                 Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Court's decision             
            in Keystone governs our decision here.  Petitioner owed the               
            Plans money which they had lent to him, and he transferred the            
            real estate to the MPP in payment of his debt to it.  Under the           
            Court's holding in Keystone, the fact that petitioner's                   
            transfer to the MPP was in repayment of his debt is enough to             
            categorize the transfer as a "sale or exchange" for purposes of           
            section 4975(c)(1)(A).  Petitioner's reliance on our decisions            
            in Wood and Keystone to support a contrary result is misguided.           
            As the Supreme Court recently stated:                                     
                 When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the                 
                 parties before it, that rule is the controlling                      
                 interpretation of federal law and must be given full                 
                 retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct                 
                 review and as to all events, regardless of whether                   
                 such events predate or postdate our announcement of                  
                 the rule.  [Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation,                    
                 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).]                                             
            On the basis of the Supreme Court's opinion in Commissioner v.            
            Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 152 (1993), we sustain            
            respondent's determination that petitioner is liable for excise           
            taxes under section 4975(a).                                              
                 As to respondent's determination under section 4975(b),              
            petitioner argues that this determination is wrong because "the           
            tremendous appreciation in the subject real estate since the              




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