Estate of Irving Nemerov, Deceased, Bernice Midgorden, Personal Representative - Page 12

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          and tax payment were due and to meet these due dates.  See                  
          Estate of DiRezza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. at 33-34; see also               
          Estate of Kerber v. United States, 717 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983);            
          Smith v. United States, 702 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir. 1983).                  
          Although the estate asks the Court to adopt a different rule                
          because Ms. Midgorden is not a tax professional, we decline to do           
          so.1                                                                        
               Turning to the estate's alternative argument, we reject this           
          argument as well.  As to section 6651(a)(1), the estate is asking           
          us to review the $67,135 assessment which is outside our                    
          jurisdiction.  Our jurisdiction over respondent's determination             
          under section 6651(a)(1) extends only to the $2,429 addition to             
          tax imposed on the deficiency, and, in that regard, our previous            
          finding is conclusive.  That is, the estate has failed to show              
          reasonable cause for the late filing.  The same finding also                
          disposes of the only argument made by the estate in regard to               
          section 6651(a)(2).  Because no reasonable cause was shown for              
          the late payment of $225,000, that amount cannot be subtracted              



               1 The estate does not claim that Ms. Midgorden is other than           
          an "ordinary person"; i.e., "one who is physically and mentally             
          capable of knowing, remembering, and complying with a filing                
          deadline", see United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 253 (1985)             
          (Brennan, J., concurring), and we view her to be an "ordinary               
          person".  Thus, we do not address the point made by Justice                 
          Brennan in his concurrence in Boyle that a different rule may               
          apply when a fiduciary is unable to meet the standard of                    
          "ordinary business care and prudence".                                      




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