Thomas C. Oberle and Margaret Colbert Oberle - Page 5

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                    (7) Based on all of the facts and circumstances                   
               * * *, the individual participates in the activity on a                
               regular, continuous, and substantial basis during such                 
               year.  [Sec. 1.469-5T(a)(2), (3), and (7), Temporary                   
               Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 5725-5726 (Feb. 25                      
               1988)].                                                                
          To meet the material participation test under paragraph (a)(7),             
          an individual must participate in the activity for more than 100            
          hours.  Sec. 1.469-5T(b)(2)(iii), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53            
          Fed. Reg. 5726 (Feb. 25, 1988).                                             
               Petitioners have failed to establish that they materially              
          participated in the charter activity.  Petitioners entered into             
          an agreement with the broker that gave the broker all day-to-day            
          management responsibilities, including taking all necessary steps           
          to charter the yacht.  Petitioners failed to devote 100 hours to            
          their activity in 1993 and while petitioners devoted 194 hours to           
          their activity in 1994, only 84 of such hours relate to the                 
          period when the yacht was available for charters.  Assuming                 
          arguendo that petitioners did devote more than 100 hours to their           
          activity in 1994, they have not established that such                       
          participation was greater than the broker's participation.  In              
          essence, petitioners' participation was limited to routine                  
          maintenance of the yacht and was not substantial.  Therefore, we            
          conclude that petitioners did not materially participate in their           
          chartering activity.  Cf. Chapin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.                
          1996-56; Goshorn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-578.                      






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