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"divorce or separation instrument" within the meaning of section
71(b).
In her petition, Marta further alleged that, under the
Minute Order incorporating the Tentative Decision, Norman would
continue to be liable for spousal support payments after Marta's
death, and therefore such payments fall outside the scope of the
definition of alimony. Sec. 71(b)(1)(D). Marta based this
allegation on the language of the Tentative Decision, which
states that "There shall be no termination date as to spousal
support at this time." However, Marta did not argue this point
on brief, and indeed makes no mention of it whatsoever. It is,
therefore, appropriate that the argument be deemed abandoned.
See Rybak v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 566 n.19 (1988);
Carlstedt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-331.
We have considered each of the parties' remaining arguments,
and to the extent that they are not discussed herein, find them
to be either insignificant or without merit.
Based on the above, we hold that payments made by Norman to
Marta in the amount of $63,170 from January 6, 1992, to June 9,
1992, are alimony or separate maintenance within the meaning of
section 71. As such, respondent correctly determined that they
are includable in Marta's gross income pursuant to sections
61(a)(8) and 71(a). Respondent erred, however, in disallowing
Norman a deduction under section 215(a) for these payments.
To reflect the foregoing and the concession by respondent,
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