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observing: "The language of sec. 1.469-5T(a)(3), Temporary Income
Tax Regs., contains nothing which suggests that participation
should be computed on a per unit basis. See Goshorn v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-578." Id.
We believe that only the actual time spent on a rental is
relevant to determining whether a taxpayer materially participates
in that rental. In the case herein, unlike Goshorn and Serenbetz,
petitioners have provided ample evidence of both their level of
participation and that of Rainbow Reservations with respect to the
Maui condo. Cf. Scheiner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-554. As
stated previously, petitioners' efforts far exceeded that of
Rainbow Reservations personnel at the Maui condo. Thus, we hold
that petitioners materially participated in the rental of their
Maui condo during 1993. Consequently, petitioners may deduct the
losses sustained therefrom.
We now turn our attention to the Molokai condo in which we
have already found that petitioners participated less than 100
hours. Assuming arguendo that petitioners participated for more
than 100 hours in the rental of the Molokai condo, petitioners
offered no evidence of the time spent by other individuals in the
rental of that condominium. See Chapin v. Commissioner, supra.
Petitioners assert that the lack of a fixed front desk service at
the Wavecrest Resort prevents a finding that any individual spent
more time than they did in operating the Molokai condo.
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