RJR Nabisco Inc. (Formerly R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc.) and Consolidated Subsidiaries - Page 61

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          the disputed amount was a disguised payment for the concession,             
          petitioner argues that the 7.5-percent interest payment was a               
          “sufficient” payment for tax purposes.  Petitioner states that,             
          if the $179 million payment were regarded simply as an                      
          undifferentiated lump-sum payment for property (“which”,                    
          petitioner argues, “strictly speaking, it is”), “the amount of              
          interest included in the lump sum would be determined, for tax              
          purposes, by section 483.”  Petitioner states that the applicable           
          section 483 rate was 7 percent a year compounded semiannually,              
          which, petitioner claims, is below the interest rate that gives             
          rise to the 7.5-percent interest payment.  Thus, petitioner                 
          concludes, “the interest income attributable to the Award’s 7.5%            
          rate, which petitioners reported in their 1982 return * * * , was           
          more than sufficient to meet the standard of section 483.”                  
               Section 483 imputes interest (unstated interest) to a                  
          contract for the sale or exchange of property for which there is            
          inadequate stated interest.  Section 1.483-1(b)(1), Income Tax              
          Regs., provides:  “The term ‘sale or exchange’ includes any                 
          transaction treated as a sale or exchange for purposes of the               
          Code.”  Condemnation proceedings are treated as sales for                   
          Federal income tax purposes.  See Hawaiian Gas Prods., Ltd. v.              
          Commissioner, 126 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1942), affg. 43 B.T.A. 655               
          (1941); cf. Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941).                       
          Apparently, petitioner accepts that section 483 applies to the              





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