-21-
Petitioner does not contend that he returned to employment
covered under the MEBA Plan at any time after the January 1,
1991, effective date of his pension. Indeed petitioner does not
contend that he returned to any employment on behalf of any of
the employers in the MEBA Plan after January 1, 1991. Thus, for
any time after that date, including early 1995, petitioner was a
former employee and he was not a present employee. Accordingly,
we conclude that, based on our findings as to the timing of the
determination period under section 1.7476-1(c)(1), Income Tax
Regs., petitioner was not a present employee during that period,
and so petitioner cannot be an interested party under paragraph
(b)(4) of section 1.7476-1, Income Tax Regs.8 This conclusion is
based on our analysis of the evidence in the record and our
conclusion as to what the preponderance of the evidence leads to.
Thus, the burden of proof is immaterial to this conclusion.
Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 210 n.16
(1998), and cases cited therein.
Petitioner contends that he is “classified as * * *
retired for pension purposes only.” Petitioner further argues
that--
8 To the same effect under paragraph (b)(1) of sec.
1.7476-1, Income Tax Regs., see Dillon v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1993-239, affd. without published opinion 16 F.3d 1227 (8th
Cir. 1994), and under paragraph (b)(3) of this regulation, see
Jones v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1980-512, affd. without
published opinion 676 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Day v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-251, nn.12-13.
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