- 47 -
against the person so hindered, delayed, or defrauded
shall be void. [Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 38-10-117 (repl.
vol. 1982)].
The parties do not dispute that, in order for the Colorado
fraudulent conveyance statute to apply to the transfer of pro-
perty by MSSTA to Mr. Scott and the transfer of property by MSSTA
to Ms. Scott that we have found in the instant case, it is nec-
essary that MSSTA, the transferor, was insolvent at the time of
each such transfer or was rendered insolvent thereby; the purpose
of each such transfer was to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors;
MSSTA, the transferor, acted with that intent or with an intent
to benefit or secure an advantage to itself; and Mr. Scott and
Ms. Scott, each of the transferees, knew of, or participated in,
MSSTA's intent. See Yetter Well Serv., Inc. v. Cimarron Oil Co.,
841 P.2d 1068, 1069-1070 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Wright v. Nelson,
242 P.2d 243, 246-247 (Colo. 1952); see also United States v.
Morgan, 554 F. Supp. 582, 586 (D. Colo. 1982). The dispute be-
tween the parties relates to whether MSSTA and each of the Scotts
had the intent necessary to trigger application of the Colorado
fraudulent conveyance statute. Respondent contends that they
did. Petitioners disagree. In support of their position, peti-
tioners assert:
In this case, the evidence clearly established
that neither MSSTA nor Petitioners knew that there was
an unpaid MSSTA tax liability arising from the asset
purchase transaction. Petitioners believed they had
given up an interest in MSSTA for a comparable interest
in AST without any tax consequences. Further, MSSTA
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