R. Lawrence Smith, III - Page 4

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                         (B) the divorce or separation instrument does not            
                    designate such payment as a payment which is not                  
                    includible in gross income under this section and not             
                    allowable as a deduction under section 215,                       
                         (C) in the case of an individual legally separated           
                    from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of                   
                    separate maintenance, the payee spouse and the payor              
                    spouse are not members of the same household at the               
                    time such payment is made, and                                    
                         (D) there is no liability to make any such payment           
                    for any period after the death of the payee spouse and            
                    there is no liability to make any payment (in cash or             
                    property) as a substitute for such payments after the             
                    death of the payee spouse.                                        

               The parties agree that petitioner satisfies the requirements           
          of subparagraphs (A) through (C).  They frame the issue in terms            
          of subparagraph (D)--whether petitioner's liability to make the             
          payments to his former wife's attorneys would have been                     
          extinguished if, prior to payment, his former wife had died.                
          While it seems somewhat peculiar to discuss payment of fees made            
          to a former spouse's attorneys for services in terms of alimony             
          or separate maintenance payments,2 section 71(b) does not                   
          differentiate as to the reasons for the payment.  Nonetheless, as           
          we shall see, the nature of the expense may have some bearing on            
          the resolution of the issue.                                                
               Petitioner does not dispute that the Superior Court's order            
          that he pay $25,000 created an enforceable liability.  Petitioner           
          contends, however, that the focus of section 71(b)(1)(D) is                 


               2  Cf. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).                   




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