James L. and Leta A. Thurman - Page 15

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          EMFI to treat the distributions in question as distributed first            
          from earnings and profits.                                                  
               Respondent's application of the doctrine of substantial                
          compliance on the facts in the instant case is not in consonance            
          with our previous application of the various factors used to                
          determine whether a taxpayer has substantially complied with the            
          essence of the governing statute.  In Tipps v. Commissioner,                
          supra at 468, we stated that "the omission of the required                  
          material has not operated to respondent’s prejudice."  The                  
          several factors in American Air Filter Co. v. Commissioner, supra           
          at 719, which we have used to determine whether the regulatory              
          requirements are "essential", may also be viewed in part as                 
          hinging on whether the omission of such requirements harms the              
          IRS.7  In effect, respondent asks us to apply factors, which                
          heavily favor respondent's interests, to determine that                     
          petitioners are bound by an election which, in the first place,             

               7In American Air Filter Co. v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 709,              
          719-720 (1983), we similarly listed various factors, which we               
          have used in determining whether strict compliance was required             
          as follows:  Whether the taxpayer's failure to comply fully                 
          defeats the purpose of the statute; whether the taxpayer attempts           
          to benefit from hindsight by adopting a position inconsistent               
          with his original action or omission; whether the Commissioner is           
          prejudiced by the untimely election; whether the sanction imposed           
          on the taxpayer for the failure is excessive and out of                     
          proportion to the default; and whether the regulation provided              
          with detailed specificity the manner in which an election was to            
          be made.  See Taylor v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 1071 (1977);                  
          Columbia Iron & Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 5 (1973);                
          Denman Tire & Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 706 (1950),               
          affd. 192 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1951).                                         




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