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wisdom of the Congress in promulgating such a requirement, or to
rewrite section 83(h) in a way that is more employer friendly by
substituting the word "includable" for the word "included". As
the Court has noted many times before in similar settings, we
apply section 83 according to its terms, although such an
application could result in an inequity in a particular case.
See Alves v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 878, and the cases cited
therein, for prior cases in which the Court has applied section
83 literally, notwithstanding the inequities that could occur
from such an application. Although the Congress has given the
Commissioner broad authority under section 7805(a) to prescribe
rules and regulations to implement provisions, including
provisions such as the one at hand which could otherwise be
difficult to meet in practice, the duty and province of this and
other courts are to interpret the statute as written. As the
Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed the lower courts for
almost 200 years, "where * * * the statute's language is plain,
'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to
its terms.'" United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485 (1917)); see also United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S.
95, 102-103 (1897); Oneale v. Thornton, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 53, 68
(1810). "[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there."
Connecticut Natl. Bank v. Germain, supra at 253-254.
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