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value of the services that David actually performed for decedent
from 1976 to 1984. The problem with respondent's position is
that the consideration that David provided in return for
decedent's promise was not the years of services that he actually
provided; rather, it was his 1976 promise obligating him to
provide services to decedent for her lifetime. The date on which
the contract (agreement) was made is the proper date on which to
value the consideration. Estate of Fenton v. Commissioner, 70
T.C. 263, 275-276 (1978). Thus, the value of the consideration
provided by David must be judged as of the time the contract was
made. Likewise, the value of the consideration that decedent
provided (a promise to give one-third of her estate) must be
measured at the time the contract was entered into.
There is no direct evidence of the 1976 value of David's
promise to provide lifetime services or of the 1976 value of
decedent's promise to give David one-third of her estate. We
must therefore look to other factors to determine whether the
mutual promises of decedent and David constitute adequate and
full consideration in money's worth. Generally, the best
indication of value is that which unrelated parties, dealing at
arm's length, agree to. See Bank of New York v. United States,
supra at 1016-1017.
David was not related to decedent. He was not the natural
object of her bounty or affection. At the time of the agreement,
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