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London exemplars, hindering the analyses of the handwriting
experts.
As noted in Gifford-Hill & Co. v. Stoller, supra at 630
(quoting 37 Am. Jur. 2d, Fraudulent Conveyances, sec. 10, at 701):
“‘[B]adges of fraud’. . . are said to be facts which
throw suspicion on a transaction, and which call for an
explanation . . . More simply stated, they are signs or
marks of fraud. They do not of themselves or per se
constitute fraud, but they are facts having a tendency to
show the existence of fraud, although their value as
evidence is relative not absolute. They are not usually
conclusive proof; they are open to explanation. They may
be almost conclusive, or they may furnish merely a
reasonable inference of fraud, according to the weight to
which they may be entitled from their intrinsic character
and the special circumstances attending the case. Often
a single one of them may establish and stamp a
transaction as fraudulent. When, however, several are
found in the same transaction, strong, clear evidence
will be required to repel the conclusion of fraudulent
intent. . .”
On the basis of the entire record in these cases, we hold that
respondent has produced clear and convincing proof under the
Nebraska fraudulent transfer statute that David made the transfers
with a fraudulent intent, and that David has failed to rebut this
proof by any evidence, let alone “strong, clear evidence”. Id.;
see also Kayian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-296; King Shipping
Consum, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-593.
In sum, respondent presented clear and convincing evidence
that David took actual possession of his father's assets after
March 8, 1987. David transferred these assets to himself with an
actual intent to delay, defraud, or hinder his father’s creditors;
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