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civil sanction into a criminal penalty. Id. at 99 (quoting
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1980)).
Congress intended the penalty for negligence to be a civil,
not a criminal, sanction. See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S.
391, 402 (1938); Louis v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d at 1235. The
statutory language reflects that the section 6662 accuracy-
related penalty for negligence is a penalty in connection with
civil tax liability (addition to the tax). See also Louis v.
Commissioner, 170 F.3d at 1235, where the same conclusion was
reached by the Court of Appeals concerning the civil fraud
penalty.
Having decided that a civil penalty was intended, we now
consider the following “useful guideposts” provided in Hudson to
determine whether the statutory scheme is punitive in either
purpose or effect:
(1) “[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative
disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3)
“whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter”; (4) “whether its operation will promote the
traditional aims of punishment--retribution and
deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it
appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned.”
Hudson v. United States, supra at 99-100 (quoting Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963)). These factors
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