- 4 -
Petitioner contends that because the issue of spousal
support was not waived by either party, petitioner was in fact
obligated to pay for Ms. Anderson's expenses. Petitioner asserts
that while circumstances prevented the divorce court from
ascertaining a set amount for Ms. Anderson's support, petitioner
was expected and required to provide for her financially.
We are concerned here with the provisions of section
71(b)(2). Clearly the decree does not contain any requirement
that petitioner make alimony or separate maintenance payments.
The reservation of the spousal support by the divorce decree is
not enough by itself to create a legally enforceable obligation.
Brooks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-304. Thus, neither
section 71(b)(2)(A) nor (C) applies. Moreover, there is no
separation agreement setting forth support payments. Indeed, it
is clear that there was no agreement, whether written or not.
Section 71(b)(2)(B) does not apply.
Petitioner contends that under Jacklin v. Commissioner, 79
T.C. 340 (1982), and Friedland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-
549, the divorce decree need not provide a set amount of payment
to create a support obligation. We agree.3 In each of those
cases, however, a written instrument did exist that created a
legally enforceable obligation upon the husband to either make
certain payments or maintain a certain standard of living for the
3 These cases interpret a former version of sec. 71. The
statute, as amended, still requires a decree or a written
instrument and requires that the payments be made under such
decree or written instrument.
Page: Previous 1 2 3 4 5 Next
Last modified: May 25, 2011