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that terminates that obligation ("This obligation to continue
making these house payments would terminate should * * * [Linda]
and the * * * children move from * * * [the marital home]").
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, Ray was obligated to pay for
reasonable yard maintenance for the marital home "during * * * [a
specified period] or until such time as * * * [Linda] should move
therefrom with the * * * children or remarry, whichever is
shorter." (Emphasis added.)
As long as the children resided in the marital home, one
construction of the above language would require Ray to make the
payments regardless of whether Linda continued to live there.
Under this construction, Linda's death would be of no
significance. On the other hand, if the children moved from the
marital home, which they did in 1994, Ray's obligation to make
the payments would only continue as long as Linda continued to
live there, which, obviously, she could not do after her death.
Because paragraph 5 of the agreement does not expressly
address Ray's liability to make the payments in the event of
Linda's death, we look to Arkansas law in order to determine his
liability in that regard. See Sampson v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.
614, 618 (1983), affd. per curiam without published opinion 829
F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1987).
In Arkansas, "Questions relating to the construction,
operation, and effect of separation agreements between husband
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