- 34 -
United States, supra; Bittker & Lokken, supra. With hindsight,
the disclaimant could later decide whether or not to treat the
equivocal instrument as a disclaimer or keep the property.
We had similar concerns in Valdes v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.
910, 915 (1973), where we rejected a claim of substantial
compliance:
That Congress fixed a deadline of December 31, 1965,
for making the election suggests that a taxpayer was
not to be allowed to file an ambiguous statement which
would permit him to wait and see whether the benefits
would outweigh the burdens of the election in his
individual case. Rather, as a minimum, the taxpayer is
required to definitely commit himself as to whether he
elects to have section 172(b)(1)(D) apply * * *. * * *
B. No Persuasive Evidence of Disclaimer
From the inception of this case, petitioner's counsel has
characterized respondent's determination not to recognize
decedent's alleged disclaimer as a reliance on technicalities.
According to petitioner, "the government's approach to these
cases * * * is always an approach which wants to find some minute
defect in what the taxpayer did and then deny congressionally
granted tax benefits based on that minute defect." In the
absence of a written disclaimer, petitioner has relied on the
testimony of Dale, with that of Messrs. Meyer and Kadish, the
attorneys who handled the estates of the Chamberlains
(collectively, "witnesses"), to establish that decedent
substantially complied with section 2518.
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