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entitlement to an IRA deduction on the ground that income from
his investment activity constituted "compensation" within the
meaning of section 219. This Court held that capital gain,
dividends, and interest income did not constitute "compensation"
within the meaning of section 219. On the issue of statutory
interpretation of the term "compensation", we stated:
Finally, petitioner contends that when Congress
used the word "includes" in sections 219(c)(1) and
401(c)(2)(C), it intended a broad interpretation of the
statutes rather than a restrictive one. Apparently he
is contending either that earned income is but one
example of the many types of compensation covered by
section 219(c)(1) or that the profits from his
investments constitute "compensation" within the
meaning of section 219 exclusive of section 219(c)(1).
However, section 219(c)(1) was designed to include in
the term "compensation" income earned by the
self-employed individual, which, except for that
provision, would be excluded from the definition of
"compensation" under section 219. See H. Rept. 93-779,
1974-3 C.B. 244, 369. Thus, if the requirements of
section 219(c)(1), which are in actuality the
requirements of section 401(c)(2), are not satisfied,
self-employment income will not be included in the term
compensation. Similarly, section 401(c)(2)(C) was
designed to include in the term "earned income"
earnings generated by property created by the taxpayer,
e.g., the author or the inventor, which otherwise,
depending upon the technical form of the transaction
through which the income is earned, might have been
excluded from that term. See S. Rept. 1707, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), 1966-2 C.B. 1059, 1103. [Fn.
refs. omitted.]
Miller v. Commissioner, supra at 103-104.
Petitioner contends that Miller v. Commissioner, supra, is
not applicable because the year in issue in that case, 1977, was
different from the year in issue in his case. However, the
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