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Approximately 1 week before the trial date, petitioner filed
a motion for continuance,3 asserting that respondent had failed
to comply with the standing pretrial order. Respondent countered
with a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. Three days
before trial, petitioner filed a notice indicating that all the
defendants in the University of Chicago litigation and in the
Kidder Peabody litigation would be subject to subpoena in
petitioner’s case before this Court. The Court set a hearing to
consider these motions.
At that hearing, the Court inquired of petitioner what the
University of Chicago had to do with the case at issue.
Petitioner responded:
Because the University of Chicago conspired with
two other employers to discharge me, and then after
those discharges, I was originally hired by Kidder,
Peabody as an employee and then was told, like, that I
couldn’t be an employee, and I should become an
independent contractor with them.
That was basically done because there was pending
litigation against those other employers, past
dischargers, and the University of Chicago, who had
intentionally withheld the issuance of a degree at that
point and conspired with those employers to terminate
me.
3 Rule 133 provides that a motion for continuance filed
less than 30 days before the trial date “ordinarily will be
deemed dilatory and will be denied unless the ground therefor
arose during that period or there was good reason for not making
the motion sooner.”
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